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COMMENTS 
ABANDONING CORPORATE ONTOLOGY: ORIGINAL ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATION 
Owen Alderson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The economic principles underlying the Constitution are not readily 
apparent from a cursory reading of the text.  As Charles Beard notes, the 
Constitution “places no property qualifications on voters or officers; it gives 
no outward recognition of any economic groups in society”; and “it mentions 
no special privileges conferred upon any class.”1  It delegates Congress’s 
power to regulate economic activity through, for instance, interstate 
commerce2 and taxation,3 but makes little mention of express grants of  
economic rights to individuals. 
Despite the written Constitution’s omission of economic rights, 
Americans have enjoyed constitutional protections in forwarding their 
economic interests, including in forming and operating business 
corporations.4  Since corporations gained standing to defend their interests 
in an Article III court in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,5 they have won a 
number of constitutional rights previously believed to only apply to natural 
persons.6  Although the academic and jurisprudential debate on the 
interpretation of corporate rights has ebbed and flowed, the interpretive 
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 1 CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 152 (1913).  
 2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.  
 3 Id.  
 4 See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL 
RIGHTS xviii (2018) (beginning a discussion of how corporations won constitutional rights through 
the courts). 
 5 Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 92 (1809).  
 6 WINKLER, supra note 4, at xviii; see also discussion infra Part II.   
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gymnastics needed to square these rights with the Constitution’s original text 
and history have been consistently derided by scholars across the ideological 
spectrum.  Most recently, the debate has been reignited by the Court’s 
decision in Citizens United—which provided corporations with a 
constitutionally protected right to political speech under the First 
Amendment7—a decision which has been repeatedly criticized as an 
abrogation of sound interpretive principles.8 
The convoluted and polarizing history of corporate constitutional rights 
begs important questions.  Which interpretive tools justify the delegation of 
constitutional protections to business corporations, when the original text 
and history of the document present such scant guidance?  Can the 
Constitution’s limited discussion of economic rights allow us to definitively 
declare what the law is regarding the rights of business corporations?  Under 
what circumstances do we consider a business corporation to be a “person” 
or “citizen” deserving constitutional protection?  
So far, these questions have largely been answered through competing 
theories of corporate ontology: theories of the nature of a business 
corporation and the relationship between its constituent parts.  The history 
of the debate shows a struggle between two dominant camps of thought—
the aggregate theory and the real entity theory—which offer competing 
accounts of what a corporation is, and therefore, which constitutional rights 
they ought to be assigned.9  
This Comment argues that focusing solely on competing theories of 
corporate ontology is an inadequate method of interpreting the 
constitutional protections applicable to business corporations.  It then 
provides an exploration of other means of elucidating corporate rights using 
the Constitution’s text and history pertaining to economic rights.  In 
particular, it looks at the Constitution’s treatment of property and contracts 
to ascertain a new perspective on the rights of business corporations, and the 
people who form them.  
 
 7 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).  
 8 For a discussion of the reaction to Citizens United, see infra Part II.B.   
 9 A third theory worth mentioning is the concession theory, in which the corporation is a legal fiction 
“created and empowered as a ‘concession’ from the state political authority.”  See Eric W. Orts, 
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 68 (1992) 
(noting the conflicts between concession theory and other theories of corporations).  However, as 
Elizabeth Pollman notes, though popular in the early 19th century, the theory lost relevancy once 
incorporation shifted from a special privilege granted by the state to a legislative formality.  See 
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1661–62 (2011) 
(“[T]he description of corporations as a concession from a particular state seems a poor fit in our 
modern, global environment”).  As a result, it has largely fallen out of favor in the contemporary 
debate.  
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Part I.A provides a condensed overview of the historical debate between 
competing corporate ontology theories.  Part I.B discusses the critical 
response to Citizens United, surveying the critiques employing corporate 
ontology and those which seek alternative frameworks.  Part II argues that 
competing theories of corporate ontology have been a largely inadequate 
framework for discerning whether or not business corporations enjoy a 
certain constitutional protection, due to their inconsistent application and 
tenuous relationship with the text and history of the Constitution.  Part III.A 
explores the Constitution’s structural treatment of economic rights to derive 
a constitutional principle of economic liberty, which serves as an alternative 
tool for evaluating corporate rights.  Part III.B then applies that principle to 
arrive at two prescriptive conclusions concerning the interpretation of 
corporate rights.  First, because the Constitution values one’s ability to 
contract and obtain property without unjust impairment by the government, 
courts should not distinguish between the ontology of different 
contract/property arrangements.  Second, business corporations ought to be 
granted a constitutional protection otherwise attributable to natural persons 
only if it serves the constitutional provision’s function of enhancing economic 
liberty.  In other words, the protection must enhance the corporation’s free 
agency to obtain and hold property and enter into its optimal contractual 
arrangements.  
For the purposes of this Comment, I will only be discussing the rights of 
for-profit business corporations.  Comparing the rights of for-profit 
corporations relative to non-corporate business entities, or to nonprofit 
advocacy groups, is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Although my 
analysis includes important landmark decisions concerning nonprofit 
corporations and membership associations, the discussion of these cases 
serves only to parse their subsequent impact on the constitutional rights of 
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I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE CORPORATE 
ONTOLOGY DEBATE 
A.  An Abbreviated History of Dueling Ontological Theories 
The Constitution makes no mention of the word “corporation,” 
“business entity,” or any other synonym.10  At the time of the first corporate 
constitutional rights cases, the typical corporation was wholly different than 
the modern corporation.  Corporate charters were only granted by the state 
for the performance of specific public purpose, such as building bridges, 
digging canals, and establishing trade and transportation routes.11  The 
corporation was regulated solely through its charter, which outlined both the 
special privileges granted to the corporation and the limitations on its 
operations.12  The concept of protecting these enterprises through the 
Constitution was thus a novel one, since corporations were not only scarce,13 
but also considered “quasi-public” arms of the state.14  
Nevertheless, the Marshall Court’s approach to the first corporate 
constitutional rights cases sidestepped the quasi-public nature of the early 
corporation, adopting a prototypical version of what would later be referred 
to as the aggregate theory of corporate personhood.  In Bank of the United States 
v. Deveaux,15 the earliest corporate constitutional rights case to reach the 
Supreme Court, the Marshall Court held that corporations are “citizens” for 
the purpose of Article III standing.16  Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that, 
because the natural people composing the corporation—the “real parties” in 
the case—were “citizens” for the purposes of Article III, their citizenship 
ought to allow them to sue in their collective corporate name.17  
 
 10 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 1780–1970 , at 113 (1970).  
 11 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 72–73 (1992) (discussing the reconceptualization of the corporation in the 
late nineteenth century).  
 12 See HURST, supra note 10, at 45–47, 157 (noting the fear of corporate ambition that led to limits 
imposed through the corporate charter).  
 13 See WARREN J. SAMUELS & ARTHUR S. MILLER, CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 2 (1987) (“Only approximately 300 corporations, each comparatively small in 
size, were present as late as 1800”); see also Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origin of the American 
Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 4 (1945).  
 14 Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth 
Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 428 (2003).  
 15 Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809).  
 16 Id. at 91.  
 17 Id.  
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Ten years later, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Marshall Court ruled 
that corporations were private entities whose charter was a binding contract 
between the state and the natural persons who formed the corporation.18  
This contract was thus protected by the contracts clause in the same way that 
any other private contract would be protected, and was thus rendered by the 
Court to be unalterable by the New Hampshire state legislature.19  Both 
Deveaux and Dartmouth College opted to pierce the corporate veil,20 disregarding 
the corporate form to allow corporations to exercise the same rights as its 
members.  For Marshall, the corporate form was an “invisible, intangible, 
artificial” being that the Court should bypass in order to focus on the 
individual members of the enterprise.21 
As the Marshall Court became the Taney Court, a wave of populist 
reformers sought to make the corporate form available to more business 
owners, rather than a small handful of elites for whom the state granted 
special privileges.22  But as the corporate form became more democratized, 
the Taney Court simultaneously rejected the Marshallian view that 
corporate rights ought to be determined through veil piercing to reach 
corporate participants.  In the Charles River Bridge case23 and in Bank of Augusta 
v. Earle,24  the Supreme Court rejected veil-piercing in favor of an approach 
that limited a corporation’s ability to seek constitutional protection.  To the 
Taney Court, “whenever a corporation makes a contract, it is the contract 
of the legal entity—of the artificial being created by the charter—and not the 
contract of the individual members.”25  Whereas citizens of foreign states 
could do business anywhere under the comity clause of Article IV, 
corporations were distinct and separate entities from their members and 
could not claim such protection.26  
 
 18 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 691 (1819).  
 19 Id. 
 20 This Comment adopts “piercing the corporate veil” as used by Winkler to describe the process of 
looking past the corporate form to reach the individuals comprising the corporation.  See WINKLER, 
supra note 4, at 66.  
 21 Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 73.  
 22 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634 
(1988) (discussing the Jackson-era critiques of special privilege incorporation and subsequent 
reforms); WINKLER, supra note 4, at 92 (describing the introduction of “general incorporation” laws 
during the Jacksonian period).  
 23 Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 
(1837).  
 24 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839).  
 25 Id.  
 26 WINKLER, supra note 4, at 101  
 
566 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
Furthermore, the Earle decision rejected the bank’s argument that, if 
corporations were “citizens” for the purposes of the Article III standing post-
Deveaux, they ought to be “citizens” under Article IV comity.27  The Taney 
Court would further restrict corporations’ claims to “citizenship” for the 
purposes of Article III standing, again on the basis that the corporation was 
a separate legal entity from its individual members.28  The Taney Court 
therefore forwarded the idea that corporations were separate and distinct 
entities afforded less protection than natural persons.  However, the Court 
did so in a way that unmoored the doctrine of corporate constitutional rights 
from any form of consistent application of the text and its original meaning.  
It merely set corporations apart as separate legal entities, with little guidance 
on exactly how and when constitutional personhood applied differently to 
corporations.   
Reconstruction and the Gilded Age saw a revival of the aggregate theory 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence, this time in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Most notably, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, Justice Field’s 
opinion held a railroad corporation to be a “person” for the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, entitling a corporation’s property to the same equal 
protection rights as individual stockholders.29  Although the Supreme Court 
originally avoided the question of whether the railroad corporation was a 
“person” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court reporter ended up stating that the justices were in agreement that they 
were.30  
Two years later, the Court would reaffirm the Santa Clara “holding” in 
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, ruling that 
“corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special 
purpose . . . .  The equal protection of the laws which these bodies may claim 
is only such as is accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of 
the State.”31  Not only did the Court articulate the view that a corporation 
was a mere association of individuals with identical interests to those 
constitutive individuals, but also that corporations should receive 
constitutional protection of shareholder property rights equal to the 
 
 27 Id. at 100.  
 28 Id. at 103.  
 29 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
 30 Id.  
 31 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888); see also 
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 33 (1889) (holding that the Fourteenth amendment 
applied to protect railroad companies).  
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protection given to unincorporated businesses or persons, such as sole 
proprietorships and partnerships.32  As Winkler notes, calling corporations 
“persons” was the textual hook for affording Fourteenth Amendment 
protection.  However, this was not to say that they had rights in and of 
themselves; their rights were an instrument to protect the property rights of 
shareholders.33  
The Lochner Court, however, refused to pierce the corporate veil to extend 
the aggregate theory beyond deprivation of property under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, forming a split between property rights and liberty rights.  This 
split would play out in the Court’s handling of the corporate criminal 
defendant.  In Hale v. Henkel, the Court held that corporations were protected 
by the Fourth Amendment’s limit on unreasonable searches and seizures, but 
not the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.34  Although, at one 
point, Justice Brown refers to corporations as “associations of people,”35 his 
opinion relies on the view that the corporate form is a distinct legal actor, 
separate from its members (in this case, the company’s employees).36  
Whereas individuals owe “no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge 
his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to 
incriminate him,” corporations are not protected by the same rationale.37  
The Court remained consistent with the property/liberty dichotomy 
found in previous Lochner Era cases.  Whereas the Fourth Amendment was 
inherently a protection of property, and thus appropriately attributable to 
the corporation, the Fifth Amendment was one of personal liberty that the 
Court would not extend.38  Their explanation sought to justify why 
corporations were considered “persons” for the Fourth Amendment but not 
the Fifth, but in the end only served to confuse the debate further.  With Hale 
still on the books, its treatment of the Fifth Amendment remains an outlier 
of its time in its rejection of veil piercing and embrace of the real entity 
theory. 
 
 32 See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 
173, 174 (1985).  See also Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 1645.  
 33 WINKLER, supra note 4, at 159–60; see also Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative 
Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1695 (2015) (describing the 
Fourteenth Amendment protections afforded to corporations during this period as “derivative” 
rights, in that they “derived from the rights of natural persons behind the corporation”). 
 34 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70, 73 (1906).  
 35 Id. at 76. 
 36 WINKLER, supra note 4, at 187.  
 37 Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.  
 38 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations,163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 129 (2014). 
(discussing the liberty/property distinction).  
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The Lochner Court explicitly would not pierce the veil in order to grant 
rights considered to be liberty rights, rather than property rights.39  However, 
changes in the makeup of the Court during the Great Depression ushered in 
an expansion of liberty rights in two key areas—association and speech—
that paralleled the contemporaneous expansion of civil rights.  In NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Paterson, the Court held that members of a nonprofit 
membership corporation were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against state-compelled disclosure of the group’s membership list, which 
restrains the members’ freedom of association.40  The Court based their 
decision to pierce the veil on the fact that the NAACP was not a business 
corporation, and instead a voluntary association of members using the 
corporate form to advocate for their political ends.41  There was a unique 
“nexus” between the corporation that made the two “in every practical sense 
identical.”42  Although the Court adopted the aggregate theory due to the 
NAACP’s nonprofit, voluntary membership form of organization, the Court 
noted that it was “immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by 
association pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters” 
when deciding whether a given state action curtailing the freedom to 
associate is subject to strict scrutiny.43  
The broad language of Patterson gave enough leeway for the expansion of 
corporate speech rights for business corporations using the aggregate theory 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Citizens United.  In Bellotti, the Court 
rejected the argument that the First Amendment rights of a corporation 
derive purely from their business and property interests.44  Instead of the kind 
of veil piercing seen in Santa Clara, Bellotti’s conception of corporate speech 
rights rested on the rights of the public to inform themselves, casting off the 
“identity of its source, whether a corporation, association, union, or 
individual” as irrelevant.45  Rather than explicitly calling corporations 
“associations of people,” the Court suggested that the same treatment ought 
to apply for a corporation as to individuals, including the individuals 
 
 39 See, e.g., W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (holding that corporations do not 
have a right to freedom of association).  
 40 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).  
 41 See id. (“We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association 
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful 
private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  
 42 Id. at 458–59.  
 43 Id. at 460–61.  
 44 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783–84 (1978).  
 45 Id. at 777.  
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comprising the corporation and the individuals who would be informed by 
the corporation’s “speech.”  
The Court later followed the same strategy in Citizens United to strike 
down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s restrictions on corporate 
spending as violative of First Amendment speech rights, overturning two 
previous cases (McConnell46 and Austin47) and expanding corporate First 
Amendment rights to allow corporations to spend unlimited amounts of 
money on any kind of election.48  Unlike in Bellotti, however, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion largely hinges on an explicitly aggregate view of 
the corporation.  “If the First Amendment has any force,” Kennedy 
reasoned, “it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations 
of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”49  Restricting corporate 
spending (speech) was therefore a persecution against the “association of 
citizens” that comprised the corporation and “the right of citizens to inquire, 
to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition 
to enlightened self- government and a necessary means to protect it.”50 
B.  Modern Responses to Corporate Ontology: Doubling Down and Exploring 
Alternatives 
Citizens United was met with, and still garners, harsh criticism.  Many of 
the most prominent objections to the decision chose the aggregate theory of 
corporate personality as their main point of contention.  Throughout his 
dissent, Justice Stevens railed against the majority’s theory of the 
corporation, arguing for a strict dichotomy between natural individuals and 
 
 46 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  
 47 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  
 48 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 460 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 49 Id. at 349 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  Although the corporation involved in Citizens United 
was a nonprofit, Justice Kennedy refused to confine his decision to nonprofits, despite the Solicitor 
General’s invitation to limit the decision to nonprofits that are “funded overwhelmingly by 
individuals.”  Id. at 327–29.  Instead, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the same First Amendment 
protections must be afforded to for-profit corporations as nonprofit corporations.  See id. at 365 (“No 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.”).  
 50 Id. at 339.  
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corporations.51  Responding to dismal polling of the decision’s popularity,52 
political figures from across the ideological spectrum derided the opinion as 
a symptom of pervasive corporate influence in elections, using the opinion as 
a rallying cry for campaign finance reform measures.  There was even a 
proposed constitutional amendment to codify the real entity theory, 
definitively separating corporations from natural persons.53   
As for the academic debate, numerous constitutional and corporate law 
scholars have criticized Citizens United  by arguing that the Court’s decision is 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the corporation.54  
Notably, Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court (along 
with two co-authors) has written a trio of articles attacking Citizens United in 
which he argues that the case not only misconceived the nature of the 
corporation, but was also irreconcilable with the originalist doctrines 
espoused by many of the conservative justices signing onto the majority 
opinion.55  These critiques echo those levelled at the aggregate theory since 
the height of the Taney Court, calling for a real-entity interpretation in order 
to limit corporate constitutional rights and reduce the outsized influence of 
corporate special interests.56 
 
 51 See, e.g., id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing corporations and natural human speakers 
in the context of public office elections); id. at 423–24, (discussing the disparate ramifications of 
limiting corporate spending on elections as opposed to individual spending); id. at 428 (arguing that 
the Framers “had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they 
constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of 
individual Americans that they had in mind”). 
 52 See Ashley Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans Want to Kill ‘Citizens United’ with Constitutional Amendment, 
PUB. RADIO INT’L (May 10, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-10/study-
most-americans-want-kill-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment. 
 53 We the People, Not We the Corporations, MOVETOAMEND (Jan. 6, 2018), https://movetoam
end.org/we-people-not-we-corporations-2.  
 54 This Comment will not exhaust the scholarly objections to the decision here, but for a particularly 
biting critique, see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 25, 
2010, at 65 (asserting that Citizens United is wrong on the basis that corporations should not be 
afforded First Amendment protections).  
 55 See generally, Leo E. Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between 
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015); Leo E. 
Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with 
Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877 (2016); Leo E. Strine Jr. & Jonathan Macey, 
Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451 (2019).  For an alternative discussion 
on Citizens United’s irreconcilability with originalism, see also Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original 
Understanding, and the Problem of Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2012); Amanda D. Johnson, 
Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187 (2010). 
 56 Chief Justice Strine is not the only scholar to question Citizens United using corporate ontology 
theory.  See generally Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327 (2014) 
(arguing that the concession theory of corporate ontology ought to play a more prominent role in 
the corporate-constitutional debate).  
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Others have shied away from employing corporate ontology in criticizing 
Citizens United, and corporate rights more broadly, and have suggested 
alternative frameworks.  For example, Elizabeth Pollman has suggested a 
framework that looks to the “purpose of the constitutional right at issue, and 
whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the 
corporation.”57  A similarly functionalist approach is forwarded by Jess 
Krannich, who argues for an abandonment of corporate ontology in favor of 
an approach that examines “the values and policies underlying each 
constitutional right.”58  Brandon Garrett recognizes the inconsistencies of the 
Supreme Court’s approach and instead argues that the rights of business 
corporations ought to be framed in terms of organizational standing doctrine 
under Article III.59  These alternative frameworks provide valuable 
contributions to a reframing of corporate constitutional rights.  However, 
these accounts do not resolve the central question posed by Strine: when, if 
at all, does granting corporations constitutional rights comport with 
originalist principles?  They are thus not likely to satisfy those seeking an 
approach that is rooted in the text and history of the Constitution.  
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH CORPORATE ONTOLOGY 
From the precarious evolution of corporate rights doctrine, it is no 
surprise that competing theories of corporate ontology continue to stoke 
debate.  In fact, it is the method’s very malleability that makes it prone to 
controversy.  As evidenced in the cases described above, the Court has failed 
to apply a consistent framework when it comes to deciphering the nature of 
the corporation.  
This is not necessarily the Court’s fault.  The corporate form has 
undergone significant changes since Deveaux.  With the introduction of: 
limited liability; broader federal and state regulation; increased political and 
social power; and the growing separation between passive investors and 
active management,60 the relationship between shareholders, the 
corporation, and the state has shifted drastically.  The growing complexity of 
 
 57 See Pollman, supra note 9, at 1631.  
 58 Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 64 (2005).  
 59 Garrett, supra note 38, at 101–02.  
 60 This is what Berle and Means refer to as the “separation of ownership and control.”  See generally 
ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932).  
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the corporate form inevitably allows for multiple conceptions of the 
corporation that are facially correct, or at least defensible.  
However, as Pollman argues, “oscillating between these conceptions 
demonstrates the weakness of this approach,”61 and creates vulnerabilities for 
exploitation.  The Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach can be seen less as 
indecisiveness on corporate ontology, but rather the opportunistic use of 
one’s preferred theory to achieve the desired ends in the case.  
This legal realist view was forcefully advanced by John Dewey in his 
influential article, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality.62  Dewey 
argues that the debates over the attributes of a “person” were wrongly 
imported into the legal discussion.63  As a result, “[e]ach theory has been 
used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing 
ends.”64  Dewey’s critique is an effective one, especially post-Citizens United, 
as both the aggregate theory and the real entity theory have been used to 
forward other interests.65  For example, Justice Taney’s use of the real entity 
theory can arguably be seen as an instrument to pursue preference for states’ 
rights and a disdain for special corporate privileges that inhibited free market 
competition, as opposed to neutral use of a theory rooted in constitutional 
best practices.  Santa Clara could be seen as an example of using the 
associational theory for similar jurisprudential sins.  Some commentators 
have suggested the case represents a concerted effort to frame corporations 
as associations of “people” in order to hide their underlying political and 
economic agenda.66  Without a guiding, underlying principle rooted in the 
Constitution’s text and history, the Court is seemingly incentivized to supply 
their own in justifying their interpretive rules of corporate ontology.  
 
 61 See Pollman, supra note 9, at 1630.  
 62 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).  
 63 Id. at 658.  
 64 Id. at 669. 
 65 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 33, at 1731 (“The Court has extended constitutional protections to 
corporations when it is a necessary or convenient way to protect the rights of the natural persons 
assumed to be represented by the corporation in question, at least with respect to the issue at 
stake.”). 
 66 See generally Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 
371 (1938) (arguing that Justice Field saw the function of Fourteenth Amendment personhood status 
for corporations as a means for implementing a laissez-faire economic policy for business interests 
and establishing constitutional rights of property on an almost absolutist basis).  A similar criticism 
has been leveled against the Citizens United decision as framing corporate speech rights as protecting 
both the members and the public in order to advance a corporatist agenda.  See generally Dworkin, 
supra note 54 (arguing that Citizens United “displays the five justices’ instinctive favoritism of 
corporate interests,” and blasting the use of veil piercing to treat corporations like “real people” as 
“preposterous”).  
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Ad hoc rationalizations using theories of corporate ontology also invert 
the ideal relationship between the original meaning of the Constitution’s text 
and constitutional rules that are derived from them—namely, that the 
original meaning of the text ought to constrain constitutional actors in 
crafting constitutional rules.67  Proponents of the aggregate and real entity 
theories alike are guilty of trying to fit a square peg into a round textualist 
hole, so to speak.  
Take the Fourteenth Amendment, for instance, prohibiting state action 
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law,” or denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”68  Conceptualizing the corporation as an association of natural 
persons for the purposes of grounding a given rule in the text may help 
rationalize why individual members ought to be entitled to a given 
Fourteenth Amendment protection, as those individuals are well within the 
original meaning of “person.”  However, it largely ignores the diversity of 
forms that the corporation takes, and the unique relationships between 
individual members and the corporate form.  It also fails to provide a cogent 
approach for discerning which “people” or “citizens” constitute the 
association.69  Most importantly, it offers no rationalization for why a 
corporate association—as its own entity, litigating in its own name—should 
be granted rights derivatively from their members.  As Blair and Pollman 
argue, this would require a detailed inquiry into whether or not a given 
corporation can be viewed as an aggregate of its members.70  Calling 
corporations associations of natural “persons” and then pointing to the text 
as conclusive in supporting the grant of a given right thus fails to do the actual 
work of connecting the text to a conclusive rule.  
On the other hand, those who criticize the Court’s approach to corporate 
rights under the real entity theory employ a similarly reductive analysis of the 
text.  To real entity theorists, the equation is simple.  The Fourteenth 
 
 67 This statement asserts a version of the “constraint principles,” thought to be one of two defining 
characteristics of originalist constitutional interpretation, as defined by Lawrence Solum.  See 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013).  
 68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 69 The “people” that the Court has sought to protect most often are shareholders.  Chief Justice Strine 
and Macey have refuted this theory by arguing that shareholders are not empirical owners of the 
corporation, but rather owners of “investment interests” whose relationship to the firm is “purely 
statutory and contractual.”  See Strine & Macey, supra note 55, at 4.  
 70 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 33, at 1733 (“The derivative nature of rights for corporations 
requires the Court to pay attention to distinctions, to explicitly acknowledge that, for some 
purposes, some corporations can usefully and functionally be regarded as aggregates of their 
members from whom rights could be derived, while other corporations serve other purposes, and 
cannot be regarded as representing any particular natural person or group of natural persons.”).  
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Amendment protects “persons.”  A corporation is not a “person” within the 
original public meaning of the word; it is an entity separate and distinct from 
the natural persons composing it (nor is the word “corporation” found 
anywhere within the Constitution).  Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not protect corporations.  This ignores the argument that, even if 
corporations do not equal “persons,” that the “persons” comprising the 
corporation nevertheless ought to be protected derivatively in some 
circumstances.  Decisions employing the real entity theory thus struggle to 
reconcile their textual absolutism that corporations do not equal “persons” 
or “people” with the legitimate need to protect the natural persons 
comprising the corporations in certain situations.  
Rather than admitting that the text is vague and using principled 
construction, competing theories of corporate ontology often try to 
manipulate the corporate form to fit squarely within the text’s definition of 
“person” or “citizen.”  But as argued above, the Constitution’s text does not 
fit squarely within any theory of corporate ontology.  Therefore, looking to 
the nature of the corporation and whether or not it is a “person” or “citizen” 
as a monist method of interpreting a given constitutional provision is not a 
sufficiently consistent or comprehensive means of examining the 
corporation’s relationship to the text.  Rather than the text constraining the 
interpretation of the rule, corporate ontology theories constrain the text to fit 
a view of the corporation that supports a pre-determined outcome.  
III.  DEFINING AND APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
The Constitution does not refer to “corporations” or any other business 
enterprises in and of themselves, nor does it explicitly make mention of purely 
economic rights of individuals.  Thus, the text alone does not include enough 
communicative content to paint a clear enough picture to justify the grant or 
denial of a given right to a corporation.71  “Gaps may be the product either 
of genuine oversight by constitutional drafters or of delegation to future 
political decision-makers.”72  While the Constitution clearly delineates 
individual rights to “the people,” “person(s),” and “citizens,” it does not 
explicitly dictate how to treat those individuals collectively when they decide 
to form a corporation, nor does it anticipate the vast changes in the corporate 
 
 71 This can be seen as a “gap” in the Constitution’s text, as defined by Solum and Whittington.  Solum, 
supra note 67, at 471; Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 123 (2010).  
 72 Whittington, supra note 71, at 123.  
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form over the centuries since the Founding.  Alternatively, one could 
reasonably infer that the Framers intended to leave the determination of 
corporate rights to the states, since at the time, the states had the sole purview 
to regulate corporate charters.73  In this way, corporate rights can be 
considered both a constitutional “oversight,” as well as a delegation to other 
political decisionmakers.   
This gap puts the question of which rights to grant to a corporation into 
the realm of constitutional construction.74  It is therefore imperative to 
examine  the text and history of the Constitution pertaining to economic 
rights in order to derive a principle that may be applied to corporate 
constitutional rights cases.  This involves two steps.  First, since the initial 
interpretive analysis of the “gap” of explicit constitutional provisions 
pertaining to corporations proves the Constitution facially under-
determinative, this Comment will look to other areas of the Constitution 
where the text implicitly or explicitly communicates principles relating to the 
economic rights of individuals.  This will be done in a way that both 
interprets the text and constructs general principles derived from what the 
text communicates.  The end result of this preliminary inquiry is to discern a 
principle of economic liberty.  Second, this Comment will show how the 
principle may be applied to the issue of when to delegate a given 
constitutional right to a corporation.  The goal of this two-level analysis is 
not to definitively answer which rights apply to corporations.  Rather, it is to 
create a guiding tool in determining the nature and extent of corporate 
constitutional rights that is rooted in the Constitution’s structural treatment 
of economic rights.  
 A.  Defining the Principle of Economic Liberty 
In his Lochner dissent, Justice Holmes asserts that “a Constitution is not 
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism 
and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”75  This 
kind of orthodox separation between the Constitution and economic rights 
 
 73 See supra discussion in Part II; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”).  
 74 See Solum, supra note 67, at 475 (defining the “Construction Zone” as “[t]he set of constitutional 
issues and cases for which the communicative content of the constitutional text underdetermines 
legal effect, e.g., the legal content of constitutional doctrine and the resolution of constitutional 
cases.”).   
 75 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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has been consistently forwarded by populists and political progressives to rail 
against Citizens United.  Others see ample support for the proposition that the 
Constitution was constructed to support and maintain a Smithian classical 
political economy.76  Discerning a neutral principle of economic liberty from 
the original Constitution, free of partisan economic ideology, becomes 
important if we are to then consistently apply that principle to corporate 
constitutional rights cases.  For the purposes of this discussion, this Comment 
adopts Randy Barnett’s definition of economic liberty as “the right to 
acquire, use, and possess private property and the right to enter into private 
contracts of one’s choosing.”77  The following discussion explores the scope 
of the Constitution’s treatment of economic liberty.  
1.  Property 
The Constitution’s protection of the right to private property is an 
important facet of the document’s broader treatment of liberties that we may 
consider “economic.”78  Property rights in the United States ultimately flow 
from English property theory.  John Locke revered “lives, liberties and 
estates” as natural rights;79 this reverence is embraced in the Constitution’s 
theory of property and is adopted in its text.80  Blackstone also saw property 
as an “absolute right, inherent in every Englishman . . . which consists in the 
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control 
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”81  Beyond the natural rights 
underpinnings of English property law, property ownership was seen as a key 
driver of economic growth at the time of the Constitution’s enactment.  In 
crafting the property rights of individuals, however, the Framers had to 
 
 76 See, e.g., James W. Ely Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution 1 (Vand. U. L. 
Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 07-17, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018754 (arguing that “by the time of the constitutional convention 
in 1787 the growing commitment to a market economy was eclipsing the older mercantilist regime 
as the dominant paradigm in political culture, and that this development in turn influenced the 
process of constitution drafting”).  
 77 See Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 
(2012).  
 78 Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines the word “economic” to mean “of, relating to, or based on 
the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.”  Economic, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economic?utm_camp
aign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).   
 79 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT IX, §123 (C. B. MacPherson, ed., Hackett 
1980) (1690). 
 80 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (protecting against deprivation of life, liberty, and property) 
 81 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.  
 
February 2020] ABANDONING CORPORATE ONTOLOGY 577 
balance the natural and economic rights of individuals with the government’s 
interest in reasonably regulating private property.  
Property rights are governed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth82 
and Fourteenth83 Amendments, as well as through the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause.84  “Persons, houses, papers, and effects” are additionally 
protected by the Fourth Amendment from “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”85  The Fourteenth Amendment’s language extends that protection 
to all “persons” in the United States.86  Taken collectively, the surface-level 
communicative content of these clauses is relatively unambiguous.  The 
government may not infringe or seize upon a “person’s” private property, 
without adequate legal processes entitled to the landowner, either through 
“just compensation” or through “due process of law.”87 
In requiring procedural protections, the text does not give any explicit 
limits as to how property is to be used or alienated.  It makes no distinction 
between personal and economic uses of property.  Using a given piece of land 
to build a house or a factory, for example, does not alter the prohibition on 
governmental “takings.”  Omitting distinctions on use leads to the reasonable 
interpretation that the Constitution is facially neutral when it comes to how 
a given piece of property is used.  Although the Takings Clause does not 
create limits on how the government may regulate the creation and transfer 
of private property, it does require the government to refrain from imposing 
general legislation that treats individuals or classes of individuals 
disadvantageously without due process.88  This suggests that different uses 
and arrangements of property are protected from disparate treatment.  
There remains some debate over whether there is an absolute right to 
private property ownership, or whether owning private property is a mere 
privilege subject to greater government regulation.  Some have argued that 
 
 82 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”).  
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”).  
 84 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
 85 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 86 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)  
 87 Ensuring that searches and seizures of one’s person and property are not “unreasonable” for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment acts as a similar limitation to government infringement on 
private property.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). 
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the individual right to property is bolstered by the Framers’ alleged affinity 
for strong property rights as inalienable natural rights.  Barnett, for example, 
has looked at the Ninth Amendment and various state constitutions to 
extrapolate “the natural, inherent, and inalienable rights retained by the 
people,” including “the rights to acquire, possess, and protect private 
property . . . .”89  Stuart Bruchey similarly argues, using social and historical 
data, that “the most important value of the Founding Fathers of the 
American constitutional period was their belief in the necessity of securing 
property rights.”90  Others see private property ownership as a mere social 
instrumentality that may be regulated through the Constitution’s scheme of 
a strong national government.91  One can, for example, point to the 
government’s constitutional power to enact general legislation that deprives 
individuals from their property without compensation in certain 
circumstances as evidence of the Framers’ rejection of an unfettered right to 
property ownership.92  
Natural rights constructions of inherent property rights that reach 
beyond the enacted property clauses in the Constitution’s text are ultimately 
superfluous to discerning the scope of the property clauses themselves.  By 
placing “property” on the same plane as “life” and “liberty,” and 
implementing procedural steps to limit the government’s ability to infringe 
on the use of such property without due process, property rights are 
undeniably essential to the Bill of Rights’ framework.  Although it is 
debatable as to whether there is a fundamental right to own private property 
(as opposed to a mere aspiration or guiding value embraced by the Framers), 
preventing deprivation of property ought to be a right on the same plane as 
protecting against the deprivation of life and liberty.  Procedural protections 
further allow a property owner to ensure that, once acquired, the property 
may be used as the owner wishes without the threat of discriminative takings.  
 
 89 See Barnett, supra note 77, at 5–7.  
 90 See Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System of the Early 
American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1980).  
 91 See generally Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2013) (arguing that the right to own property as “not a right, but a social 
instrumentality” for governance and increasing wealth).  
 92 See id. at 603 (pointing to the public use doctrine as an example of how the Constitution limits 
property rights under the Due Process Clause by explicitly subject private property to governmental 
intervention).  
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2.  Contract 
The Contract Clause reads that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”93  The Clause’s text alone does not 
supply an adequate level of guidance as to who it covers, the types of 
contracts to which it is applicable, or when the government is deemed to have 
“impaired” the “obligation” of a contract.  Due to its textual ambiguities and 
the under-determinative historical record surrounding the clause, the 
Contract Clause’s communicative content gives inadequate substantive 
content for a sound interpretation.  In light of this ambiguity, Richard 
Epstein has suggested two “extremes” of interpretation of the Contract 
Clause.  He posits: 
At one extreme, the clause could be limited to prohibiting legislation directed 
to the blanket discharge of existing debts.  At the other extreme, the clause 
could insulate contractual relations against any and all forms of state 
regulation, whether by legislature or court, including even so modest an 
intervention as a statute of limitations.94   
Both extremes lead to starkly different constructions for the purposes of the 
principle of economic liberty. 
An examination of the limited legislative history reveals that the clause 
pertains to state intervention in the obligations of private contracts, 
particularly those of debtors and creditors.95  There is little evidence that the 
Framers contemplated the clause applying to public land grants or corporate 
charters between the state and entrepreneurs.96  It was only under the Taney 
Court that the Contract Clause began to expand into the realm of public 
corporate charters in cases like the Charles River Bridge case.  Along with 
continuing to protect creditors from state debtor relief statutes,97 the Taney 
Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence allowed for more intensive state 
regulation of corporations.98  The change in Contract Clause interpretation 
between the Marshall Court’s Dartmouth College decision and the Taney 
Court’s Charles River Bridge case aptly illustrates the distinct “private” and 
 
 93 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.  
 94 Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 708 (1984).  
 95 See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 1604 (explaining that the Constitution’s Framers were “principally 
concerned with state attempts to relieve debtors from their creditors.”). 
 96 Id.; see also BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15–17 
(1938).  But see Epstein, supra note 94, at 721 (“Even if the text of the contract clause is ambiguous 
on the question of whether the prohibition it states extends to public contracts, the theory behind 
the text calls for such an extension.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843); Gantly’s Lessee v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 
707 (1845). 
 98 See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 1605.  
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“public” branches of Contract Clause doctrine emerging from the era.99  
However, this bifurcation of the Contract Clause does not necessarily stem 
from the meaning of the original clause.  As Hovenkamp notes, it is the result 
of shifting economic system from a mercantilist “vested” rights system to 
classical economic “substantive” rights system, and a subsequent evolution 
of doctrine surrounding the state’s role in regulating business corporations.100  
Examining the pre-Taney Contract Clause thus shows that its interpretation 
lies toward Epstein’s first extreme, in which the contract clause provides 
more limited protection for private contracts.  His second extreme, in which 
the clause protects from state impairment any and all substantive rights 
pertaining to both state and individual contracts, seems less plausible.  
Although I disagree with Epstein’s analysis of the Clause’s public/private 
application, his construction of the term “obligation” better fits with the 
communicative scheme of the Clause.  Epstein reads the “obligation” as 
embracing “the entire relationship,” rather than just the debtor’s 
obligations.101  He also claims that the clause protects other kinds of contracts 
than those between creditor and debtor.102  The language—“obligations of 
contracts”—is too general to include only one form of obligation, namely the 
debtor-creditor relationship.  Although the evidence shows that debtor-
creditor relations were a chief concern of the Framers, the text does not limit 
its communicative content to this relationship alone.  Other relationships, 
could conceivably be impaired by improper state action.103  
The key limiting factor of protections that the Contract Clause affords to 
private contractors lies in its application to past, and not future, contracts.104  
The term “obligations” in and of itself implies a pre-existing arrangement to 
which two or more parties are bound.  Historical studies show that the 
Framers’ were concerned with state retroactive impairment of contracts as 
creating a riskier environment for the investment of capital; if investor 
contracts could be cancelled at whim, investors were at risk of losing their 
investment.105  Applying the Contract Clause prospectively to any and all 
contracts that one might enter into goes beyond this narrow purpose of the 
 
 99 Id. at 1604.  
 100 Id. at 1603.  
 101 Epstein, supra note 94, at 722–23.  
 102 Id. at 721.  
 103 Id.  
 104 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 286 (1827).  
 105 See, e.g., David Crump, The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause, 66 SMU L. REV. 687, 689–95, 697 
(2013) (tracing the history of the contract clause’s ratification to conceptualize the clause as a policy 
of reassuring investors).  
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clause.  The Contract Clause thus gives investors protection against ex post 
nullification of their investments,106 but not blanket protections for the 
contracts that they will prospectively form.  
In total, the Contract Clause protects private contracting, but does not 
apply to any and all contracting.  Reading between the lines of the clause 
reveals that the extent to which it promotes economic liberty is thus more 
limited than some may hope.  
3.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment has been a broad vehicle for expanding the 
rights of corporations.107  However, text and history show that the 
Amendment was enacted as means of promoting social and political equality, 
and not as a broad expansion of substantive economic rights.  This becomes 
clear when viewing the Amendment in the context of the two amendments 
that bookend it, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth.  Taken together, the 
amendments represent a common scheme reflecting the rights of recently 
freed African-American slaves, granting those newly freed people—and by 
virtue, all citizens—civil and political birthrights.108  
So-called Substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been used in a number of decisions to strike down state economic 
regulations.109  Endemic to Lochner Era decisions is a blanket “freedom of 
contract” principle, purportedly grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In Frisbie v. United States, the Court then broadly held that, “generally 
speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of 
contract.”110  The same principle was commandeered by the Court, for 
example, to strike down  a state economic act as a broad violation of “liberty 
of contract,”111 and to strike down a wage and hour law for bakers in New 
York.112  
 
 106 Id.   
 107 See discussion supra Part I.A.  
 108 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, at ch. 10 (2005).  
 109 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).  
 110 Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895).  
 111 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).  
 112 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (“There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or 
the right of free contract . . . .”).  For a complete dissemination of the “freedom of contract” 
jurisprudence during the Lochner Era, see generally David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, (George 
Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 08-51, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1239749. 
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However, the plain language of the text precludes the kind of expansion 
of economic liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment that the Lochner Era 
Court envisioned.113  For one, the text does not add any extra language to 
distinguish it from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; it merely 
extends the same protection of property to the states.114  Additionally, as with 
the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensures that adequate processes are implemented to protect 
private property ownership.  The rights are inherently procedural, and not 
substantive, meaning they do not entitle individuals or corporations to strike 
down any law that impacts their business.  In order to invoke the Clause, one 
must have been deprived of property due to inadequate procedure, rather 
than mere inadequate substance of the law.  All of this is clear from a fairly 
superficial interpretation of the text.115  
An alternate source of substantive economic principles underlying the 
Amendment could be found in the Equal Protection Clause, as was held in 
Santa Clara.116  However, like the Due Process Clause, the goal of the 
Amendment was not an economically substantive one, but one of procedural 
equality.  From a base interpretation, the clause (in context) merely grants 
that persons will be treated with equal process but does not affirmatively 
advance explicit or implicit economic principles.   
Finally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause offers some hope for 
economic libertarians as a justification for an expansion of economic 
liberties.  As Akhil Amar notes, “privileges and immunities” can refer to a 
panoply of rights, including those enumerated in the original bill of rights 
 
 113 The broad “freedom of contract” principle described here has largely waned since the New Deal 
and the subsequent development of the Fourteenth Amendment’s rational-basis test.  See id. (“As 
New Deal liberals came to dominate the Court, even the rational basis test, applied literally, seemed 
too stringent . . . .  In general . . . freedom of contract is [currently] almost entirely unprotected 
under modern constitutional law.”).  Nevertheless, some modern scholars still cling to the “freedom 
of contract” principle and advocate for its return, although this viewpoint is in no way mainstream.  
See, e.g., DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT (2011) (advocating for a rebirth of the Lochner Era’s freedom of contract jurisprudence).  
 114 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV with U.S. CONST. amend V.  
 115 For further critiques of Substantive Due Process, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (Harvard U. Press 1980) (arguing that substantive 
due process is a “contradiction of terms”); Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1045, 1059 (1997) (arguing that “substantive due process is not based on the text of the 
Constitution or the intentions of those who made it” and that substantive due process is an 
oxymoron).   
 116 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886) (stating that a railroad corporation 
is protected by the Equal Protection clause).  
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and “other canonical legal sources.”117  John Bingham, the chief drafter of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, used similar language from the original Bill of 
Rights in the Privileges and Immunities Clause.118  The Clause in context 
therefore entitles citizens to broad, fundamental protections that states were 
not allowed to infringe upon.119  As a result, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause can arguably be seen as a codification of, inter alia, the right of citizens 
to obtain and use private property and enter into contract, although this 
construction is only discoverable through a historical look into the what the 
text communicates. 
* * *  
The preceding examination of the original Constitution illuminates a 
structural principle of economic liberty.  That principle is rooted in a person’s 
right to acquire, possess, and use private property and to contract with others 
in a way protected from ex post impairment by a state legislature without 
adequate procedural safeguards.  The principle of economic liberty can be 
broken into three constitutive “sub-principles”:  
1. The ability to alienate and use one’s private property to one’s 
preferences is an essential value to our constitutional order.  Private 
property is thus protected through the procedural safeguards of due 
process and just compensation from disparate governmental 
infringement.  
2. A person ought to be able to invest capital through private contracting, 
without fear of retroactive nullification of their investment.  Those 
private contracts are thus protected from nullification by the Contract 
Clause.  
3. The Fourteenth Amendment expands the application of the procedural 
protections of private property and contract, applying those protections 
equally and neutrally to all persons.  It does not otherwise expand the 
substantive content of the principle of economic liberty beyond mere 
codification in the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
B.  Applying the Principle of Economic Liberty 
Now that this Comment has outlined the Constitution’s principle of 
economic liberty, it is now time to see how constitutional actors can apply 
the principle in deciding whether a business corporation ought to benefit 
from constitutional protection.  The application of the principle yields two 
prescriptive conclusions.  First, because the Constitution values one’s ability 
 
 117 See AMAR, supra note 108, at 386.  
 118 See id. (“In fact, Bingham borrowed directly from the Bill itself with his language  ‘No . . . shall . . . 
make . . . law . . . abridging’—all words lifted directly from the First Amendment.”).  
 119 Id. at 387.  
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to contract and obtain property without unjust impairment by the 
government, courts should not distinguish between forms of contractual and 
property arrangements.  Second, business corporations ought to be granted 
a constitutional protection otherwise attributable to natural persons only if 
the purpose of the protection is economic liberty enhancing, in that it 
enhances the organization’s free agency to obtain and hold property and 
enter into contracts in the way that it sees fit.  Only those rights that protect 
the corporation and its members’ ability to obtain property and enter into 
contracts support economic liberty.  Applying the principle of economic 
liberty therefore does not allow business corporations to enjoy constitutional 
rights that pertain to purely political or civil rights (such as speech, religion, 
and voting).120  
1.  Organizational Neutrality 
As explained in the previous Part, the principle of economic liberty places 
limits on the government’s ability to infringe upon one’s right to use property 
and contract to their desired economic ends.  Indeed, for the modern 
entrepreneur, there are a number of different forms that a business enterprise 
might take, representing an infinite amount of unique arrangements of 
property ownership and contracting.  The entrepreneurs may choose to 
organize their business into a sole proprietorship, a limited partnership, a 
limited liability company, a corporation, etc.  Choosing to incorporate allows 
entrepreneurs a number of advantages, including perpetual ownership of 
corporate property and protection of personal assets from liability.  The 
corporate form also allows for the enterprise to solicit and contract with 
investors in order to raise capital.  If the entrepreneurs choose to incorporate, 
they may further choose to keep the company closely held or release shares 
for wide public ownership.  
In ensuring equal procedural safeguards for property and contract 
regardless of the substantive ends, the economic liberty principle suggests 
that a given constitutional right should be granted if it does not favor a 
particular structure for the enterprise’s property and contracting, or, 
conversely, penalize the choice of a given form.  In other words, the decision 
of whether or not to incorporate, and the form that the corporation takes, 
should neither encourage nor discourage any particular use of property and 
contract.  In his article, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, Vincent 
S.J. Buccola posits that this logic—what he calls the principle of 
 
 120 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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“organizational neutrality”—already underlies the scattered history of 
corporate rights jurisprudence.121  Although organizational neutrality is 
advanced as an empirical observation concerning the underlying logic of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the economic liberty principle justifies its 
use as a positive tool of constitutional decision making. 
Employing organizational neutrality eliminates the need for the Court to 
look at the constituent parts of the corporation based on an ad hoc theory of 
corporate ontology; such theories are unnecessary for deciding whether the 
corporation’s members should be protected derivatively through the 
corporation.  To illustrate, imagine two business enterprises: Alpha and Beta. 
Alpha is a limited partnership founded by two brothers, Tom and Dave, who 
each own 50% of Alpha’s assets, including a factory where they manufacture 
thimbles.  Beta is a closely-held corporation also founded by two brothers, 
Bob and Jim, who each own 50% of the company’s common stock.  Beta also 
owns a factory for manufacturing thimbles.  Both factories are seized by the 
government, and Alpha and Beta sue in separate cases, asserting that the 
Fifth Amendment protects them from the unconstitutional taking of their 
respective factories without just compensation.  A judge rules in favor of 
Alpha, but rules against Beta, on the theory that corporations are separate 
and distinct entities from their shareholders, and therefore should not be 
treated the same as the natural “person” shareholders.122  One could 
alternatively imagine that the judge could employ the aggregate theory to 
rule that, because Beta is just an aggregation of the property interests of its 
shareholders, it should be protected by the Fifth Amendment in order to 
protect those shareholders.  Here, the judge’s use of corporate ontology is 
dispositive of their decision. 
The principle of economic liberty eliminates the need to rule on grounds 
of corporate ontology.  Using that principle, the judge can rule that denying 
Fifth Amendment property protection to the corporation penalizes the act of 
incorporation by removing the procedural protections of property 
ownership.  It would be against the principle if the constituent natural 
persons of Beta lose those protections by virtue of the enterprise’s decision to 
arrange their property and contract interests in a certain way, i.e., to 
incorporate.  Whether the corporation is a mere aggregation of shareholder’s 
voices or an entity incapable of speech is irrelevant.  Granting the right to 
corporations unfairly biases the non-corporate form over the corporate form, 
 
 121 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 503 
(2017).  
 122 For a similar illustration, see id. at 503. 
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rewarding the Alphas of the world and punishing the Betas.  In this case, the 
choice of organization is indeterminate; their ability to freely choose their 
arrangement was what was impacted.  The judge can therefore avoid some 
of the constitutional missteps brought about by invoking a corporate 
ontology theory by using this alternative approach. 
It is worth noting that commercial speech protections under the First 
Amendment123 complicate a black-and-white application of organizational 
neutrality.  This depends on the scope of commercial speech protection 
provided by the First Amendment.124  For instance, commercial speech 
advocates who believe that such speech ought to be fully protected by the 
First Amendment may argue that, because incorporation would remove a 
constitutional protection otherwise enjoyed by non-incorporated entities, 
that organizational neutrality is violated.  On the other hand, if one believes 
that commercial speech ought to be entirely unprotected (or, at least not as 
robustly protected) by the First Amendment, then there is no penalty to 
incorporation.  Whether the business is incorporated or not, its commercial 
speech is granted the same level of protection.  
2.  Property and Contract 
Aside from organizational neutrality, the principle of economic liberty 
suggests that only economic rights, i.e., affecting one’s right to the free use of 
property and contract, should attach to corporations in order to protect their 
constituent persons.  In other words, the right should only be granted to 
business corporations if granting such a right serves the underlying 
constitutional provision’s function of enhancing some facet of the economic 
 
 123 The Supreme Court has held that First Amendment protection applies to commercial speech that 
proposes a commercial transaction.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (affirming that commercial speech is protected under the 
First Amendment).  According to the Court, full First Amendment protections apply to speech that 
advocates against a commercial purchase or neutrally describes a product or service.  See Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 512–13 (1984) (holding that an unflattering 
Consumer Reports review of a Bose sound system was protected under the First Amendment).  
However, speech advocating for a purchase receives reduced protection.  Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).  
 124 Perspectives vary greatly on whether commercial speech (i.e., advertising) ought to be protected by 
the First Amendment.  For an argument in favor of expansive commercial speech protections, see, 
e.g., Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, CATO INST., 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/commercial-speech-values-free-expression#_
idTextAnchor000.  For arguments against such an expansive right, see, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The 
First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L. J. 981 (2009); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective 
of the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).  
 
February 2020] ABANDONING CORPORATE ONTOLOGY 587 
liberty principle.  Pollman advances a version of this framework in Reconceiving 
Corporate Personhood, arguing persuasively that, instead of merely substituting 
one metaphor of corporate ontology for the other, the Court should take a 
functionalist approach in deciding whether the right is intended to support 
the economic rights of a the corporation’s constituent members, namely the 
property and contract interests of the shareholders.125  The principle of 
economic liberty lends further support for this argument, and links Pollman’s 
framework to the text and history of the Constitution’s treatment of 
economic rights.  Adopting such a framework would take the debate back, in 
a way, to the Lochner Era, when the Court was more reticent to extend 
constitutional rights to corporations that were not substantively protective of 
property and contract.126  
To put this idea to work, let’s go back to our illustration using non-
incorporated Alpha and incorporated Beta.  Again, their factories are seized 
by the government, and again, they both sue in their respective business 
names, invoking Fifth Amendment protection against takings without just 
compensation.  Alpha wins their case, and now, the same judge has to decide 
Beta’s fate.  Rather than having to choose between an aggregate or real entity 
theory in order to conceptualize Beta’s ontology, the judge can first look to 
whether the function of the Fifth Amendment right is supported by the 
principle of economic liberty.  If it is, the judge can then decide if granting 
the right to Beta would serve that purpose.  Given that the Takings Clause 
protects the enjoyment and use of private property, its function is supported 
by the principle of economic liberty.  Granting the right to the individual 
members derivatively through the corporation would serve the purpose of 
the Takings Clause, because, as Pollman notes, “individuals still ultimately 
hold rights with economic value related to that property.”127  Therefore, Beta 
ought to enjoy the same protection as unincorporated Alpha.   
Now, let us say that Alpha and Beta are looking to donate to their 
preferred pro-thimble Super PACs, who plan to blast the airwaves with 
advertisements supporting the pro-thimble candidate leading up to that 
year’s presidential election.  Tom and Dave of Alpha donate $2000 each 
from their personal bank accounts, whereas Bob and Jim of Beta donate 
$4000 from their corporate treasury.  However, Congress has recently passed 
a statute that corporations may not use money from their general treasury 
 
 125 See Pollman, supra note 9, at 1671–72. 
 126 See supra Part I.  
 127 See Pollman, supra note 9, at 1671.  
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fund to finance “electioneering communications” promoting a particular 
candidate, making Beta’s donation illegal.  Because Alpha’s donation was 
made by natural individuals, they have no issue under the statute.  Beta sues, 
arguing that the prohibition on spending violates their First Amendment 
right to free speech.128  In their complaint, Beta argues that their corporation 
is just an association of two individuals who have a right to free speech, just 
like their friends over at Alpha.  Rather than addressing their corporate 
ontology argument, the judge can look to whether the purpose of the First 
Amendment right is supported by the principle of economic liberty.  He may 
then rule that it does not, in that the First Amendment’s purpose is to protect 
political rights, and not to serve an underlying economic liberty function, i.e., 
protecting property and contract.  Granting a First Amendment protection 
to Bob and Jim through Beta would not serve a purpose supported by the 
principle of economic liberty.  If denying the right to free speech harmed Bob 
and Jim’s economic rights in any way, it would be a tangential harm at worst.  
CONCLUSION 
Issues surrounding corporate ontology will continue to be debated, but 
as this Comment has argued, those debates rarely bring about a useful 
framework for deciding the constitutional rights of business corporations.  
The principle of economic liberty, constructed using the Constitution’s text 
and history, can act as a guide for discerning corporate rights that replaces 
the corporate ontology debate.  Not only is it a more practical tool, it is also 
easier to square with the Constitution’s text and history.  Using the principle 
of economic liberty can ultimately allow future constitutional actors to decide 
corporate cases in a more consistent manner than the preceding corporate 
constitutional case law has shown.  
 
 
 128 Assume for our purposes that Citizens United has not been decided yet.  
